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Implement secure backups

All information and examples in this article are implementation recommendations for secure backups.

Nothing here is contractually binding.

Backups are your last line of defense during ransomware and destructive attacks.

Recovery success depends on backup quality, frequency, retention, and the ability to restore quickly.

Conditions for Stoik cyber insurance

Stoïk cyber insurance sets backup requirements during underwriting.

Minimum requirement: at least one weekly backup must be:

  • offline, or

  • on immutable storage

With a minimum retention of 2 weeks.

If offline or immutable is not possible, a less recommended option is a secure online backup.

The backup system stays connected, but must meet all requirements below:

  • Backup system is outside the AD domain

  • Backup system is segmented (firewall + allowlist access)

  • Backup deletion/modification is only possible via a web console protected by MFA

Goal: even with a compromised domain admin or cloud admin, an attacker still cannot wipe backups.

Backup types (and what counts)

Type
Typical examples
Why it matters
Meets the requirement?

Offline backups

External drives, USB media, offline NAS, magnetic tapes (LTO/DLT)

Highest protection. Not reachable over the network.

Immutable online backups (cloud)

AWS S3 Object Lock, Azure immutable blobs (WORM), Wasabi Object Lock

Reachable online, but cannot be altered or deleted.

Online backups (on‑prem / data center)

Dedicated backup server with restricted access

Can be acceptable only if access is strongly isolated.

(only if hardened)

Non‑immutable online “storage” (cloud)

Dropbox, Google Drive, OneDrive without WORM

Easy to use, easy to delete if accounts are compromised.

Local backups

Local disks, file copy on the same server, RAID mirroring

Gets encrypted or deleted with the host. Not a recovery plan.

“Secure online backup” means “resilient against a typical ransomware playbook that tries to delete all backups”.

Offline backup options

Use rotation. Keep at least one recent copy disconnected.

Option
How to do it safely

Magnetic tapes (LTO/DLT)

Rotate at least 2 tapes. Keep 1 tape offsite/offline at all times.

Offline NAS

Connect only for the backup window. Disconnect after the job. Rotate multiple devices if possible.

External drives / USB media

Connect only for the backup window. Disconnect after the job. Store in a locked location. Rotate multiple devices.

Immutable backup options

Cloud-hosted immutable backups

Provider
Immutability feature
Guide / docs

AWS

S3 Object Lock (and/or Glacier)

Immutable S3 backups

Azure

Cloud backup solutions

Wasabi

Back up your data with Wasabi

Acronis Cyber Protect Cloud

Compliance mode (check your plan/version)

Scaleway

Object Storage (check Object Lock support)

OVHcloud

Object Lock for S3 Object Storage

Fast LTA

“Zero Loss Storage”

Locally hosted immutable backups

Provider / product
Prereqs
Guide / docs

Veeam Linux Hardened Repository

Veeam >= 11. Requires hardening of the repository host.

Synology

DSM >= 7.2. Requires supported models.

Dell Data Domain

Use compliance mode.

Examples of “unsecured” backups

These are common patterns that fail when attackers take over admin accounts.

Example
Why it fails

Dropbox / Google Drive / OneDrive / SharePoint (no WORM)

A compromised admin can delete data and also purge recycle bins / retention.

“Immutable” NAS implemented only in software

If the NAS OS is compromised, the attacker can still destroy volumes.

Outsourced data center with a permanent network link

Functionally similar to an online file server. Ransomware can encrypt/delete over the link.

Non-immutable cloud storage

If the cloud admin is compromised, the attacker can delete buckets, backups, and retention rules.

Even with offline/immutable storage, operational controls often decide recovery success:

  • Test restores on a schedule (at least monthly for critical systems).

  • Use separate backup admin accounts. Do not sync them from AD.

  • Enforce MFA on backup consoles and cloud accounts.

  • Keep backup credentials out of user endpoints (no saved passwords in scripts).

  • Enable alerting on backup job failures, retention changes, and deletion attempts.

  • Document the restore runbook and keep a copy offline.

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