Implement secure backups
Backups are your last line of defense during ransomware and destructive attacks.
Recovery success depends on backup quality, frequency, retention, and the ability to restore quickly.
Conditions for Stoik cyber insurance
Stoïk cyber insurance sets backup requirements during underwriting.
Minimum requirement: at least one weekly backup must be:
offline, or
on immutable storage
With a minimum retention of 2 weeks.
If offline or immutable is not possible, a less recommended option is a secure online backup.
The backup system stays connected, but must meet all requirements below:
Backup system is outside the AD domain
Backup system is segmented (firewall + allowlist access)
Backup deletion/modification is only possible via a web console protected by MFA
Goal: even with a compromised domain admin or cloud admin, an attacker still cannot wipe backups.
Backup types (and what counts)
Offline backups
External drives, USB media, offline NAS, magnetic tapes (LTO/DLT)
Highest protection. Not reachable over the network.
Immutable online backups (cloud)
AWS S3 Object Lock, Azure immutable blobs (WORM), Wasabi Object Lock
Reachable online, but cannot be altered or deleted.
Online backups (on‑prem / data center)
Dedicated backup server with restricted access
Can be acceptable only if access is strongly isolated.
(only if hardened)
Non‑immutable online “storage” (cloud)
Dropbox, Google Drive, OneDrive without WORM
Easy to use, easy to delete if accounts are compromised.
Local backups
Local disks, file copy on the same server, RAID mirroring
Gets encrypted or deleted with the host. Not a recovery plan.
“Secure online backup” means “resilient against a typical ransomware playbook that tries to delete all backups”.
Offline backup options
Use rotation. Keep at least one recent copy disconnected.
Magnetic tapes (LTO/DLT)
Rotate at least 2 tapes. Keep 1 tape offsite/offline at all times.
Offline NAS
Connect only for the backup window. Disconnect after the job. Rotate multiple devices if possible.
External drives / USB media
Connect only for the backup window. Disconnect after the job. Store in a locked location. Rotate multiple devices.
Immutable backup options
Cloud-hosted immutable backups
Locally hosted immutable backups
Veeam Linux Hardened Repository
Veeam >= 11. Requires hardening of the repository host.
Examples of “unsecured” backups
These are common patterns that fail when attackers take over admin accounts.
Dropbox / Google Drive / OneDrive / SharePoint (no WORM)
A compromised admin can delete data and also purge recycle bins / retention.
“Immutable” NAS implemented only in software
If the NAS OS is compromised, the attacker can still destroy volumes.
Outsourced data center with a permanent network link
Functionally similar to an online file server. Ransomware can encrypt/delete over the link.
Non-immutable cloud storage
If the cloud admin is compromised, the attacker can delete buckets, backups, and retention rules.
Operational controls (recommended)
Even with offline/immutable storage, operational controls often decide recovery success:
Test restores on a schedule (at least monthly for critical systems).
Use separate backup admin accounts. Do not sync them from AD.
Enforce MFA on backup consoles and cloud accounts.
Keep backup credentials out of user endpoints (no saved passwords in scripts).
Enable alerting on backup job failures, retention changes, and deletion attempts.
Document the restore runbook and keep a copy offline.
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